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Providing Creative Remedies To
Bystander Emotional Distress Victims: A

Feminist Perspective
DEBORAH

K.

HEPLER*

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Ten-year-old Kara Kumiega was a victim of rheumatoid arthritis,
a crippling disease in a child. Because the disease had caused a
deformity of her jaw, her oral surgeon recommended correcting it
using a bone graft from one of her ribs. A second surgeon was
engaged to perform the graft. During surgery a tracheostomy was
performed on Kara to ease her breathing while she recovered. Kara's
eight-year-old sister, Maryanne, and her mother and father visited her
after the surgery. Mrs. Kumiega sat on Kara's bed to be close to her.
Suddenly one of Kara's arteries ruptured, spewing blood from her
nose and her tracheostomy tube and splattering her mother. Kara
died within the hour.'
The Kumiegasfiled a proposed malpracticecomplaint against the
two doctors, who subsequently entered a settlement agreement with
the bereaved family. The agreement included "excess damages" for
emotional distress. In determining whether such damages were compensable from the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund, the court
indicated it was "mindful of the Kumiegas' insurmountable loss."'
*

Appointea law clerk to the Hon. Larry J. McKinney, Judge, United States

District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 1994 to 1996; J.D. Candidate,

1994, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis; A.B., 1981, Indiana University
at South Bend.
I wish to acknowledge with deepest gratitude the thoughtful comments of
Professor Stanley Ingber, whose insights and advice helped refine the analysis I have
attempted. I would also like to thank the Hon. Jon D. Krahulik, Justice, Indiana
Supreme Court, for the time he set aside to be interviewed for this article. Finally,
my thanks to Professors Paul T. Hayden and David Ray Papke, for their unflagging
support and encouragement, and to Adel J. Chareq, who provided valuable comments
on earlier drafts. Any errors that remain are solely my own.
1. Eakin v. Kumiega, 567 N.E.2d 150, 151-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
2. Id. at 152.
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Nevertheless, Indiana law follows the rule that damagesfor emotional
distress can be recovered only when accompanied by and resulting
from a physical injury.3 After debating whether physical injury was
actually required or just "mere physical contact," the court stated
that the rationale of the rule required an injury of some sort. The
injury served as something tangible that assures the court that "mental
disturbance actually occurred."4 In response to the Kumiegas' assertion that it was undeniable that they experienced emotional disturbance at witnessing their daughter's tragic death, the court said it was
not in a position to exempt them from the harshness of the rule.I
Stories like the Kumiegas' illustrate how courts struggle with the
concept of compensating sufferers of severe emotional distress. What
do these emotional distress victims really want from the law? In
addition to compensation and a measure of assurance that the defendant will not repeat such careless behavior, the victims arguably want
official recognition that their injuries are legitimate. 6 Compensation
and deterrence are typically espoused as the goals of tort law. But
recognition of the legitimacy of the injury is unique to psychic harm
or emotional distress claims.'
Sufferers of severe emotional distress must heal, but their healing
process is more complex than the process involved with physical
injuries. In addition to needing time and the assistance of a professional, the emotionally traumatized person also needs to know that
society views the injury as legitimate. 8 This knowledge is an essential
part of the healing process. Knowing that the community understands
their distress, and acknowledges that it is not an abnormal reaction
under the circumstances will facilitate victims' recovery. 9 Such knowl3. Id. Kumiega was decided before the Indiana Supreme Court eliminated the
requirement that emotional distress damages result from a physical injury in Shuamber
v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991), and might have reached a different
conclusion had it been decided nine months later.
4. Id. at 153.
5. Id.

6. Interview with Jon D. Krahulik, Justice, Indiana Supreme Court, in Indianapolis, Ind. (Oct. 26, 1992) [hereinafter Krahulik]. See Diane H. Schetky, M.D. &
Melvin J. Guyer, Civil Litigation and the Child Psychiatrist, 29 J. AM. A.cAD. CHILD
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 963, 965, 968 (1990).

7. These terms will be used interchangeably for variety, with no intent to
discriminate between emotional, psychic, or mental injuries, distress, disturbance or
harms.
8. See Schetky & Guyer, supra note 6, at 965, 968.
9. See Brian F. Hoffman, M.D. & Harvey Spiegel, Legal Principles in the
PsychiatricAssessment of Personal Injury Litigants, 146 AM.

305 (1989). See also Schetky & Guyer, supra note 6, at 968.

J. PSYCHIATRY

304,
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edge counteracts the lingering biases shared by some members of
society, who view the emotional distress victim as weak and somehow
defective.' 0 The emotional harm will dissipate more readily in an
atmosphere of acceptance and caring.
The wrongdoer, however, frequently denies liability and sometimes accuses victims of causing their own trauma by obsessing over
something that was "just an accident."" By engaging the legal
process, victims can demonstrate that the wrongdoer was at fault,
express their outrage, and seek validation of their injury.12 Having a
court of law recognize their emotional trauma as legitimately caused
by the negligent act of the defendant is a powerful means of assuring
victims, and others, that they are not crazy. 3 In this way, the court
acts as a substitute for the legitimizing force of the community.
The need for such assurance is present regardless of the cause of
the emotional distress, but it is more acute when such distress is the
only injury the victim has received. The extreme case is when the
victim suffers emotional distress as a result of witnessing negligently
inflicted physical injury or death to a loved one. This article focuses
on this type of case because it has traditionally caused the most
difficulties for courts in determining whether or not to provide a
remedy for these parties. Commonly called "bystander liability," this
area of law is characterized by the paradigmatic example of a mother
and child walking on the sidewalk, a car screeches around the corner,
into the two, striking and killing
accelerates, loses control and swerves
4
mother.
the
missing
but
the child
Initially, courts afforded no remedy to the mother for her emotional distress at witnessing the tragic death of her child unless she
also sustained an impact from the car.' 5 By the 1960s, courts began
10. See Landy F. Sparr, M.D. & James K. Boehnlein, M.D., Posttraumatic

Stress Disorderin Tort Actions: ForensicMinefield, 18 BULL. AM.
& LAW 283, 293-94, 298 (1990).

ACAD. PSYCHIATRY

11. See Hoffman & Spiegel, supra note 9, at 305. See also Schetky & Guyer,
supra note 6, at 966; Sparr & Boehnlein, supra note 10, at 286-87.
12. Krahulik, supra note 6; see Schetky & Guyer, supra note 6, at 965, 968.
13. Krahulik, supra note 6.
14. See generally Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
15. This is called the Impact Rule. For a detailed history of the evolution of
bystander liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress, see Thing v. La Chusa,
771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (en banc); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); and
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963) (en banc). See
generally W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Right to Recover for EmotionalDisturbanceor
Its Physical Consequences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64

A.L.R.2d 100 (1957).
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to recognize the inequity of this arbitrary line and allowed recovery
for the mother on the basis that she was in the "zone of danger" of
physical impact and thus could have reasonably feared for her own
safety. 16 The zone of danger remains a common means of limiting
liability in some states. 7
In Dillon v. Legg, the California Supreme Court was faced with
a dilemma. Applying the zone of danger rule meant discriminating
between two witnesses to the death of an infant who was run over by
a car: the sister, who was near the infant, and arguably within the
zone, and the mother, who was in a place of safety." The court
resolved the dilemma by allowing both to recover, basing the mother's
recovery on the fact that her emotional injuries were foreseeable.
Suggesting that the defendant owed a duty if the bystander's injuries
were reasonably foreseeable, the court offered three factors to be
considered:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2)
Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff
16. Amaya, 379 P.2d at 514 (the mother could have pressed such a claim but
refused to do so because she only really feared for her child, and thus, her recovery
was denied).
17. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979) (en banc); James v.
Harris, 729 P.2d 986 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of
Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1 (III.
1983); Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952); Leaon v. Washington County,
397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986); Entex., Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982);
Ellington v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 717 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1986); Shelton v. Russell
Pipe & Foundry. Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978); Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr.
Hosp., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980); Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233 (Va. 1986);
Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 362 N.W.2d 137 (Wis. 1985).
For jurisdictions which have expressly abandoned the physical manifestation
requirement reflected in the above-enumerated cases, see: Taylor v. Baptist Medical
Ctr., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981); Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Ctr. Hosp., 429
N.E.2d 789 (N.Y. 1981); and Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 323 n.9,
336 n.8 (N.D. 1986), aff'd, 452 N.W.2d 313 (N.D. 1990).
See generally Douglas Bryan Marlowe, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress:
A JurisdictionalSurvey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an
Analysis of Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 Vn.. L. REv. 781,
796 (1988); P. G. Guthrie, Annotation, Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for
Fear of Injury to Another, or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury,
29 A.LR.3d 1337, §§ 7,8 (1968).
18. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915.
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and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an
absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship. 9
After Dillon, courts all over the country began to expand liability
to include emotional distress damages of bystanders. 20 Most, however,
continued to use some sort of limitation device to keep the lid on
these claims. Limiting liability was seen as necessary in light of the
following traditional concerns about recognizing such liability: 1) the
problem of allowing legal redress for harm that is often temporary
and relatively trivial; 2' 2) the danger that claims will be falsified or
imagined; 22 3) perceived unfairness of imposing a heavy or disproportionate financial burden on a merely "negligent" defendant; 23 4) the

19. Id. at 920.

20. See Di Costa v. Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., 973 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992)
(giving full history of California's development of tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress since Amaya); Estrada v. Aeronaves de Mexico, 1992 U.S. App.
Lexis 179 1 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 1992) (same aircraft accident as Di Costa, but Estrada
heard plane hit her home and saw home burn down, knowing her husband and
children were inside, she recovered for emotional distress); Thing v. La Chusa, 771
P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); Shuamber v.
Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991); Neff v. Lasso, 555 A.2d 1304 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 565 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1989) (where plaintiff appeared at
accident scene immediately after its occurrence and was allowed to recover damages
for emotional distress at witnessing the victim's injuries); St. Elizabeth Hospital v.
Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
See Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm - A Comment on The Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV.

477, 478 (1982). See also, Guthrie, supra note 17, § 9; John S. Herbrand, Annotation,

Relationship Between Victim and Plaintiff-Witness as Affecting Right to Recover
Damages in Negligence for Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Victim's Injury
or Death, 94 A.L.R.3d 486 (1974); Annotation, Immediacy of Observation of Injury
as Affecting Right to Recover Damagesfor Shock or Mental Anguish from Witnessing
Injury to Another, 5 A.L.R.4th 833 (1978).
21. See St. Elizabeth Hosp., 730 S.W.2d at 654; see also Thing, 771 P.2d at

818, 832. Garrardhas recently been criticized and overruled in part by the Texas
Supreme Court in Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993), where the court
clearly states "there is no general duty in Texas not to negligently inflict emotional
distress." Id. at 595.
22. Amaya v. Home Ice Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 522 (Cal. 1963). But one
can argue whether impact or being within a zone of danger ensures the genuineness
of the harm.
23. See Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1985) (the court recognized
arbitrary nature of the physical manifestation requirement, but found it "necessary
to curb the potential of fraudulent claims, and to place some boundaries on the
indefinable and unmeasurable psychic claims."). See generally Nancy A. Chillag,
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threat of unlimited liability; 24 and 5) the difficulty in establishing a
stopping point. 25 Despite these concerns, courts recognized the inherent injustice of allowing recovery for emotional distress when the
victims fear for their own safety, but not when they fear for the
safety of a loved one.
Liability continued to expand beyond the Dillon guidelines until
the California Supreme Court, reacting to the uncertainty caused by
such expansion, called a halt in 1989.26 The facts of Thing v. La
27
Chusa required the court to face yet another extension of liability.
A young boy was injured when struck by a vehicle driven by the
defendant. The mother was nearby, but did not see or hear the
accident. She learned of the injury when her daughter ran up and
told her about it. Rushing to the scene, she saw her son's bloody
body and believed he was dead. The mother sued the defendant
"alleging that she suffered great emotional disturbance, shock, and
injury to her nervous system as a result of these events .... 28
Apparently dismayed at the way "the Dillon guidelines [had) been
relaxed on grounds that they ... created arbitrary limitations on
29
recovery," the Thing court established firm elements of the tort.
The majority opinion held that a plaintiff may recover for emotional
distress damages as a bystander:
If, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury
victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury producing event
at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury
to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional
distress-a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated
in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal
response to the circumstances. a0
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress as an Independent Cause of Action in
California: Do Defendants Face Unlimited Liability? 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 181
(1982):
24. Amaya, 379 P.2d at 522-23.
25. Thing, 771 P.2d at 832.
26. Id. at 814. Arguably this change in position regarding bystander liability
corresponded to a change in personnel of the court. Bill Blum, Toward a Radical
Middle: Has a Great Court Become Mediocre?, 77 A.B.A. J.48, 51 (1991) (the
author, noting the change in the California Supreme Court after the 1986 elections,
observed, "[wihere once the court was unafraid to lead the law into new and
untracked areas, now it seems content to leave the leading to others."). See also G.
Edward White, Roger Traynor, 69 VILL. L. REV. 1381 (1983).
27. Thing, 771 P.2d at 832.
28. Id. at 815.
29. Id. at 821.
30. Id. at 829-30.
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The problem with using limitation devices, such as the impact

rule, the zone of danger rule, or the Thing guidelines, is that they
establish arbitrary rules that do not accurately address the traditional
concerns. 3' Such rules become difficult for judges to apply when they

face compelling facts which do not fall within the rule.3 2 Arbitrary
rules are those rules that are in discord with the underlying policy, by
either going too far or not far enough in furtherance of the policy.33
If the underlying policy is to limit liability, a rule that opens the door
to recovery for emotional distress damages on the basis of even a
slight injury goes too far. 4 Likewise, if the underlying policy is to
ensure a remedy for every wrong, a rule that refuses liability for
severe emotional distress of parents who watch their children being
killed or maimed by the acts of another does not go far enough.
These rules can lead to incongruous and sometimes unbelievable
results. For example, in the Kumiega case, the court denied the claims
of a father, mother and sister of a ten-year-old girl who died a
horrible death virtually before their eyes. The claims were denied
because Indiana still has an impact rule, and the surgeon's negligent
act, which caused the girl's death, did not have a direct physical
impact on the family members.3 5
This article does not provide a magical formula to transform
emotional distress claims into quantifiable, rational, restrained and
efficiently manageable tort actions. 6 Instead, Part I suggests one
reason why courts struggle with emotional distress claims. Such claims
31. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. See generally Marlowe, supra
note 17, at 781; Pearson, supra note 20, at 480-81.
32. See, e.g., Estrada v. Aeronaves de Mexico, 967 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir.
1992) (court allowed recovery for the emotional distress of a woman who heard an
aircraft crash into her home while she was returning home from the store, then
witnessed her house burn down knowing her husband and children were inside,
despite the fact she did not meet the Thing guidelines).
33. Pearson, supra note 20, at 478.
34. See, e.g., Adams v. Clean Air Sys., Inc., 586 N.E.2d 940, 942 (Ind. Ct.
App: 1992). The court discusses whether "impact" means the plaintiff can maintain
a cause of action for emotional distress as a result of having inhaled a potentially
harmful toxin, asbestos. The court suggests that if the plaintiff was certain he had
inhaled the toxic substance, then he could maintain the claim. Id.
35. Eakin v. Kumiega, 567 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
36. Emotional distress claims will probably increase regardless of the type of
limitation devices, rules or principles applied to their adjudication. As a society we
have changed over the past several decades in response to advances in medical and
social science that help to discern causes for distress. Consequently, we expect our
interest in freedom from emotional harm to be recognized and protected by the law.
The genie is out of the bottle and there is no turning back to pre-Dillon days.
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confront bias in the current legal system, which, according to feminist
theorists, is dominated by male norms and concepts." Part II discusses
Stanley Ingber's theory for dealing with intangible harms, wherein he
focuses on remedies. His proposal provides for limiting damages,
rather than liability. Such a change in focus may lead courts out of
the thick forest of confusion and conflicting rules in which they find
themselves.
Part III argues for more creativity in analyzing bystander emotional distress claims, to expose underlying biases and to recognize
the effect the law has on shaping society's values, attitudes and
beliefs. A recent Ninth Circuit opinion provides an example of a more
creative approach."a In it, the court used a subjective, victim-based
approach to analyze whether or not an employer owed an employee
a duty to protect her from the sexual harassment of a co-worker.3 9
Although society has a strong interest in limiting all liability for
negligent acts, bystander claims have experienced a disproportionate
number of arbitrary limits than others. Rather than (vorry so much
about limits, it would be better to focus on why these claims have
presented so much difficulty and what other mechanisms are available
for dealing with them. Gender bias should be removed from the
determination of whether or not the defendant owes a duty, and
better ways should be found to compensate victims of emotional
harm. Court-annexed mediation, which allows for the creative exploration of remedies far beyond those a court of law could offer, should
be explored as an effective means of dealing with intangible harms.
If tort law's goal is to provide a remedy for recognized wrongs and
deter future improper conduct, the focus should be less on whether
there is a duty, and more on what should and can be done about this
type of harm.
I.

FEMININIST PERSPECTIVE

Courts have trouble dealing with emotional distress claims because they are trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. Emotional
harms are unquantifiable, irrational, inconsistent, and not easily
subjected to a cause and effect analysis.40 Our system of jurisprudence
tends to be concerned with quantifiable, rational, consistent and
See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
See Sparr & Boehnlein, supra note 10, at 292-93; Stanley Ingber, Rethinking
Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REv. 772, 778 (1985).
37.
38.
39.
40.
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predictable results. Feminists assert that this tendency is a result of
the development of law from a male reference point. 4' Feminist theory
evaluates and criticizes the "unstated assumptions behind . . . law
.. .that presuppose the universality of a particular reference point
or standpoint. ' 42 Men, it is argued, are taken as the point of reference
and their measures have become the standards. 43 By "challenging the
hidden privileging of one perspective," however, a person risks substituting her own. 44 Instead of advocating a substitution of their own
perspective, feminists stress the inability of any single overarching
framework to provide an adequate account of social experience. 45 It
is better, they argue, to include multiple theories of social experience
to avoid privileging any one approach. Nevertheless, feminists assert
that "[O]ur problems stem less from jurisprudential focus than from
an absence of effective strategies for accommodating the needs of
independence and interdependence."
Feminist theorists also advocate greater emphasis on relationships
and responsibilities. 47 The traditional legal approach, in contrast,
speaks in terms of rights. 4 Feminists caution, however, against an
overemphasis on differences between men and women as an explanation for legal phenomena, because such emphasis risks oversimplification and tends to set norms which may be inaccurate.4 9 "A useful
strategy is to pay attention to competing perspectives on a given
problem, and to challenge unstated points of view that hide their
assumptions from open competition with others. In sum, we need to
pay attention to what we give up as well as what we embrace." 50
Using this strategy, courts can more effectively analyze whether or
not to extend liability to cover the psychic harm of a bystander.
Claims for emotional distress are strongly identified with women.,
Prosser, in his treatise on torts, noted that "fright-based physical
41. Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J.
47, 48 (1988).
42. Id. at 48.

EDUC.

LEGAL

43. Id.
44. Id. at 56.

45. Deborah L. Rhode, The "Woman's Point of View", 38 J.LEGAL EDUC.
39, 41 (1988). The author recognizes and appreciates the fact that there is no single
"feminist point of view" and, by using the singular of the words "perspective" or
"feminist," I do not mean to imply that there is.
46. Id. at 44.
47. Id. at 42.
48. Id. at 42-43.
49. Id. at 43.
50. Minow, supra note 41, at 56.
51. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
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injury cases so frequently involved miscarriages 'that [miscarriage]
has come to typify them.' ' ' 2 If miscarriage typified these claims, then
women obviously were the predominant claimants. Men tended not
to bring claims for emotional distress damages alone, especially not
as a result of the loss of a relationship." But women would and did.
Their claims, however, were seen as subjective, emotional and intangible.54 "[Iln a gendered world, injuries are socially constructed so
that the gender of the person claiming a loss can affect the legal
conceptualization of the harm."" Emotional distress claims are conceptualized as "subjective" and "intangible," which trivializes and
marginalizes them, and places them beyond the scope of the law's
objective reach.
Feminist theorists suggest that the law is "structurally biased
against the class of plaintiffs who bring such suits." 56 To support this
view, consider that recovery for fright-based claims was disfavored in
the law until recently, and that women were more likely to sue for
such claims.1 7 By 1964, Prosser noted that even though miscarriage
claims were "still plentiful, there [were] also a good supply of cases
of heart attacks, and the like, occurring to mere males."", It is
interesting to note how this increase in male claimants corresponds to
the beginning of changes in the law respecting such claims. Amaya,
MIcH. L. REV. 814 (1990). Dubbed "fright based claims" by
Chamalles and Kerber, they recount the history of these claims. Id. at 819-23. Citing
Professor Leon Green, a legal realist scholar during the 1930s, Chamalles and Kerber
point out that of the forty fright-based negligence cases he studied, thirty-five were
brought by women. "The significant fact is that women tended to bring this type of
lawsuit far more often than did men." Id. at 844-49. See also Fleming James, Jr.,

Fright: A History, 88

Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 778, 792 (1953). "In addition

to the danger of false claims, the fact looms large that in many of these cases there
would be no substantial injury to the vast majority of men." Id.
52. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 363 (1984).
53. Men, however, had greater protection from the law when they suffered a
loss of their relationship with their wives. In loss of consortium cases, the relationship
was seen as an economic interest, fully protectable by the law. See Chamalles &
Kerber, supra note 51, at 817-18. If a man did bring a pure emotional distress claim
he was seen as "possessing subnormal resistance." Hubert W. Smith, Relation of
Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV.
193, 280 (1944) (quoting Chamalles & Kerber, supra note 51, at 850).
54. Chamalles & Kerber, supra note 51, at 819.
55. Id.at 816.
56. Id.at 845.
57. Id.
58. Chamalles & Kerber, supra note 51, at 845 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 350 n.80 (1964)).
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decided in 1963, recognized the right to 'recover for emotional harm,
resulting from fear of harm to a loved one, if the plaintiff was also
in the zone of danger and reasonably feared for his or her own
safety.59 Then in 1968, Dillon eliminated the zone of danger limitation
device.60
Amaya and Dillon were also decided during the cold war period.
During that period, domesticity became almost mythic. 61 "The family,
particularly the mother, became a symbol of stability and security." 62
In that context, courts began to recognize the legitimacy of some
fright-based claims of mothers. If motherhood was so important for
stability, then legally recognizing mothers' interests in the safety of
their children was consistent with attaining the goal of increased
stability. 63 It was in their roles as mothers that Lillian Amaya and
Margery Dillon appeared before the court. In this way, the Dillon
decision was "congruent with the deeply domestic political ideology
of cold war society."
The year 1968 was also a transitional political year, and one in
which feminists became increasingly vocal and active. 65 "If the rhetoric
of the Dillon opinion looks back to the privileging of motherhood

...
the result ...
is also congruent with the feminist movement ...... ,6 It was perhaps the combination of recognition of the

value society placed on her relationship with her children, and the
notion that women had a right to assert their claims that encouraged
Margery Dillon and her attorney to pursue her claims in the face of
Amaya.
Despite the sentimentality for motherhood it encompassed,
Dillon pushed against the marginalization of recurring injuries
in the lives of women and gave women a claim of legal right.
A decision that had the concrete effect of putting money into
the hands of women through the redistributive mechanism of
tort liability may be understood to serve women's interests. 67
59. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 517 (Cal. 1963).
60. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
61. Chamalles & Kerber, supra note 51, at 859.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 860.
64. Id.
65. Chamalles & Kerber, supra note 51, at 861. In 1968, feminists picketed the
Miss America Contest and a two-year old National Organization of Women (NOW)

called for an equal rights amendment, access to safe, legal abortions, and enforcement
of antidiscrimination laws. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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The argument that gender played a role in the development of
both the barriers to and the right to recovery for claims of bystander
emotional distress is persuasive. Taking account of gender in a tort
liability context, however, can result in recognizing differences, which
can also lead to marginalization. 68 On the other hand, by ignoring
differences, inequitable results may follow. 69 One way to get around
these two unsavory results, according to feminist writers, is to become
skeptical of conceptual dualisms .70
Society has structured its thinking around a "complex series of
dualisms, or opposing pairs: rational/irrational; active/passive;
thought/feeling; reason/emotion; culture/nature; power/sensitivity;
objective/subjective; abstract/contextualized; principled/personalized."' 1 These dualisms are worth discussing because: 1) they reflect
gender stereotypes, with one half considered masculine and the other
half feminine; 2) the terms are not equal, but set up a hierarchy, with
the masculine side privileged as superior; and 3) the law is identified
with the masculine side.72 Another dualism that could be added is
physical/emotional. Thinking in dualisms is a limited way of viewing
the world, as it does not take into account the complex interrelationship between the opposites. "To be locked into a series of dualisms
that pose men against women ... inhibits our ability to establish
context and to perceive hidden relationships of dominance and subordination." 3
Despite their criticism of the law as being masculinized, they
refuse to substitute their own version of gender bias. Rather, feminists
argue for recognition of diverse perspectives, and against the concept
of universality. Buried among their analytical tools is the idea that
the facts and contexts of each case must be considered. Likewise, the
context and hidden assumptions behind the court's policy choices
must be examined. For example, society's interest in limiting liability
forms a legitimate basis for drawing lines only if "society" refers to
both men and women, and accounts for the experiences of both.
When the rules are made from a masculine reference point, using
traditional male measures as the standard, it is the masculine prop68. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:An Essay,
95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1375-76 (1986).
69. Chamalles & Kerber, supra note 51, at 863.
70. Id.
71. Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSrVE
CRITIQUE 453, 461 (1990).
72. Id.
73. Chamalles & Kerber, supra note 51, at 863.
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ertied interests, and not society's interests, that are balanced against
the need to expand liability.
For policy reasons, negligence law balances the social utility of
the defendant's behavior against the risk of serious harm it poses to
others, and determines conduct to be negligent when its risks outweigh
its utility. 74 Under a feminist-designed system, utility would include
fostering an ethic of care, and behavior would be found negligent if
its "care and concern for another's safety or health fails to outweigh
its risks of harm." ' 7 From this stance, attention is paid to the
competing perspectives on a given problem, and unstated points of
view "that hide their assumptions from open competition with others"
would be challenged. 7 6 A system based on an ethic of care would
require courts to pay attention to what society gives up as well as
77
what it embraces.
Tort law from a feminist perspective would focus on interdependence and collective responsibility rather than individuality, and
on safety and help for the injured party rather than on "reasonable74. See RicHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-9
(1982); see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); Gary Minda, The JurisprudentialMovements of
the 1980's, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 604-09 (1989).
75. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer On Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 32 (1988).
76. Minow, supra note 41, at 56.
77. Id. In California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683
(1987), and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 107 S. Ct. 1046
(1987), the Supreme Court paid attention to "what is lost when power reinforces a
version of reality that coincides with dominant social arrangements." Minow, supra
note 41 at 59. The Court took seriously the perspectives of the plaintiffs, although
the perspectives were at odds with current social arrangements.
The plaintiff in Guerra was a pregnant woman whose needs were not covered
by her employer's rules, and the plaintiff in Hobbie was a Seventh Day Adventist,
whose needs were not covered by the laws governing unemployment. In Hobbie, the
Court refused to give credence to the Appeals Commission's argument that Hobbie
brought her problem on herself by converting to the religion after she had accepted
the employment at issue. The Court stated that Hobbie "was forced to choose
between fidelity to religious belief and continued employment; the forfeiture of
unemployment benefits for choosing the former over the latter brings unlawful
coercion to bear on [her] choice." Hobbie, 107 S. Ct. at 1051. The Court recognized
and supported the perspective of the religious convert, rather than that of the
employer. In essence, the Court noted that "existing social arrangements are no more
privileged or immune from challenge than any competing arrangement when confronting allegations of burdens based on a personal or group difference." Minow,
supra note 41, at 59.
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ness" and economic efficiency. 78 The adversarial system, a competitive, sparring style of conflict resolution, is an "intellectualized
substitute for duelling or medieval jousting." 7 9 The win-lose model
was created by men in their own image and may not be the best
method of dispute resolution for every type of dispute. 0 Because the
current legal system developed from an "unstated male norm," it has
never focused adequately on harms to women.8 1 "Men have and have
had the power to set the standards in law and in our ideology and
have used that power to subordinate women. They have framed the
terms of our debates, established our language, named our concepts,
and served as the norm." '8 2 For example, consider the "reasonable
person" standard. 3 The underlying concept is still a reasonable man,
lawyers applying it do so
because the predominantly male judges8 and
4
with reference to their own experiences.
Although negligence law imposes a "standard of care" on the
defendant in determining whether a duty has been breached, "care"
is not the operative word. Instead the standard as applied connotes
"reasonableness," which may or may not reflect an attitude of caring.
Reason and reasonableness are gendered concepts, with reason and
rationality attributed as masculine, and emotion and intuition as
feminine.8 5 One feminist writer suggests the proper standard should
be the "conscious care and concern of a responsible neighbor or
social acquaintance for another under the same or similar circumstances." '8 6 Such a standard reflects the interconnectedness of each
person and the value of social responsibility. The current trend of
measuring behavior by its utility leads to the question of whether we
have really gained anything by "legally condoning behavior that causes
enormous physical and mental distress and yet is economically effi-

cient? ''87

78. Bender, supra note 75, at 4.
79. Id.at 7.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 8 n.16.

82. Bender, supra note 75, at 20.
83. Formerly referred to as the "reasonable man" standard.
84. Changing the language of the standard from "man" to "person," without
changing the personnel applying the standard does not result in any significant
change. However, a discussion of what changes in personnel would be needed to
inject greater diversity in judicial perspectives is beyond the scope of this article.
85. Bender, supra note 75, at 23. But see Katha Pollitt, Are Women Morally
Superior to Men?, 255 THE NATION 799, 800-01 (1992).

86. Bender, supra note 75, at 31.
87. Id.
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Economic gains can translate into social losses. The law can be
a "positive force in encouraging and improving our social relations,
rather than reinforcing our divisions, disparities of power, and isolation.""8 It can also be a means of undermining social values by
disregarding them when determining utility. When the law refuses to
compensate a mother for the severe psychic or emotional harm she
experienced as a result of witnessing the infliction of serious bodily
injury or death to her child, it is saying that a nurturing relationship
is not valued and will not be protected. 9 "The masculine voice of
rights, autonomy, and abstraction has led to a standard that protects
efficiency and profit ....",90
Proponents of the current legal system argue that the feministadvocated subjective standard does not produce a fair result. Certainty
and objectivity, they say, are necessary for disputants to feel they
have been treated justly. Admittedly, legal systems must try to ensure
fairness, but "[flairness must have reference to real human predicaments." 9 ' It is this need for a concrete referent that distinguishes
feminist jurisprudence.
A recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision demonstrates
the effective use of a subjective standard in a sexual harassment case.9 2
Kerry Ellison, a revenue agent for the Internal Revenue Service, was
the target of unwelcome romantic interest by a fellow revenue agent.
She complained to her supervisor, and the other agent was transferred
to another office but was allowed to return after six months. Upon
receiving notice of his impending return, Kerry filed a formal complaint with the Treasury Department, who investigated and decided
she failed to state a prima facie case of sexual harassment due to a
hostile work environment. 93 She then filed a complaint with the federal
district court, who granted summary judgment in favor of the government for the same reason. 94

88. Id.

89. Unless, of course, the relationship was between a man and his wife, in
which case it was a property interest and thus worthy of legal value. See supra note
53.
90. Bender, supra note 75, at 31.
91. Scales, supra note 68, at 1380.
92. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). The court said it
adopted this perspective because "a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be
male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women." Id. at
879.
93. Id. at 875.
94. Id.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that in determining whether
"the severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment" created a hostile
work environment, the court should focus on the perspective of the
victim. 9 The court reasoned that men and women experience things
differently, and that consequently it should adopt "the perspective of
a reasonable woman. 96 Therefore, to state a prima facie case of a
hostile environment, the plaintiff must allege "conduct which a
reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment. '97 Judicial creativity such as this is necessary when so
many competing interests are at stake.
Use of an abstract, "neutral" standard can distance the result in
a given case so far from reality that it bears no relation to fairness at
all. "Abstract universality . . . is particularly unsuited for law. Law
is, after all, a social tool. It is only extrinsically important. Its actual
value depends upon its success in promoting that which is intrinsically
valuable." 98 Although people may not agree on what is intrinsically
valuable, certain social relationships qualify on the basis of survival
of the human race. A parent/child relationship is one of them, as is
that of a husband and wife. At the very least, the law should recognize
the value in these relationships and compensate for trauma to them.
Feminist jurisprudence rejects the notion that for the legal system
to work it must have objective rules, but it admits that legality
requires certain qualities.
There must be something reliable somewhere, there must be
indicia of fairness in the system, but neither depends on
objectivity. Rather, we need to discard the habit of equating
our most noble aspirations with objectivity and neutrality. We
need to redefine those terms, and probably to use others, to
meet our very serious responsibilities. 99
Feminist theory is not standardless. Feminists agree with Cardozo
and other legal realists that standards are not and should not be
means without ends. "They never have and never can be more than
working hypotheses."' 10 These hypotheses, Cardozo declares, are
95. Id. at 878.
96. Id. at 878-79.

97. Id.

98. Scales, supra note 68, at 1380.
99. Id. at 1402.
100. Id. at 1403. See also BENJAMIN N.
PROCESS 23 (1921).

CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
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"continually retested in those great laboratories of the law, the courts
of justice."101
According to feminists, however, "a case is either conformed to
a standard or the standard is modified with justification. That justification should not be 'we like the petitioner's facts better;' rather, it
is that 'on facts such as these, the standard doesn't hold up.' The
feminist approach takes justification seriously."10 2 Although feminist
jurisprudence criticizes tort law's handling of emotional distress claims,
it also prescribes the social goals toward which administration of the
substantive law should be aimed. Such goals can only be met when
courts heed the policy arguments favoring them and examine the
rationales of past decisions to weed out hidden bias and the privileging
of one class or category over another.
II.

INGBER'S PROPOSAL:

A Focus

ON REMEDIES

Another way the law meets social goals is through the remedies
it offers to those who have a legally recognized right to recover for
their losses. The remedy should be selected and measured in a way
that corresponds with the underlying policy of the substantive law.
"It should not be broader than the substantive rule that invoked the
remedy in the first place, nor, ideally, should it be narrower."' 13
Dobbs notes that this simple point is often overlooked by courts when
a remedy is given or denied without regard to the purpose for which
01 4
the law was invoked.
"Judicial remedies fall into one of four major categories: (1)
damages remedies; (2) restitutionary remedies; (3) coercive remedies;
and (4) declaratory remedies." 5 A damages remedy involves payment
of money to the plaintiff. The restitution remedies may include money,
but may also include rescission of a contract. It is a remedy of
restoration which typically is used to correct unjust enrichment of the
defendant. 0 6 Coercive remedies include injunctions, backed by the
court's contempt power. Finally, declaratory remedies declare the
rights between the parties and may include an injunction. None of
101. CARDOZO, supra note 100, at 23. Feminists might say the more appropriate
laboratory would be in the realm of real human experience.
102. Scales, supra note 68, at 1403. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971); J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 80
(1961).
103. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 1.2, at 3 (1973).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1.
106. Id.
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these remedies contemplate a court order to a defendant to apologize
or perform some task to make amends. Such an order would be
analogous to specific performance of a personal service contract,
107
which is frowned upon in the law as akin to involuntary servitude.
Consequently, the additional remedies that might help a victim of
severe emotional distress heal are arguably unavailable from law or
equity.
Courts might have less difficulty deciding cases involving psychic
harm claims if they focused on the remedy rather than on whether or
not there is liability. By focusing on liability, courts have developed
an "all or nothing" attitude toward compensation for intangible
injuries.' 0 8 This focus results in either the defendant owing a duty to
the plaintiff, which is breached, and the plaintiff recovers in full for
emotional distress, or the defendant not owing a duty to the plaintiff,
who subsequently does not recover. This all or nothing thinking sets
up a barrier to recognition of and compensation for legitimate emotional injuries because it creates arbitrary rules that exclude specific
classes of victims.
The goals of tort law, consequently, are not met when such
arbitrary rules interfere. "[T]he tort process serves to compensate
victims, disperse and thus minimize the impact of the losses they
experience, deter wrongdoers, and vindicate societal and personal
values. Moreover, these goals are to be accomplished without unduly
impairing or discouraging societal development and human interactions."109 Some have questioned whether the tort process meets these
0
goals, especially when dealing with intangible harms."1 Tort law,
nevertheless, does not and cannot provide full compensation for all
losses. For example, if D broke P's watch, which was an heirloom,
D pays the market value, not the value to P. Likewise the law's ability
to disperse losses depends on the type of loss. Emotional distress is a
type of intangible injury that is nontransferable and nonquantifiable. " 1 "Nontransferable" means that when D pays P money damages,
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
108. Ingber, supra note 40, at 772-73; see also Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 337, 342 (1990).

109. Ingber, supra note 40, at 772.
110. Id. at 774 n.10. Intangible harms refers to emotional or mental distress, as
well as pain and suffering and dignitary harms. See generally Symposium, Corrective
Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403
(1992); Susan Randall, Corrective Justice and the Torts Process, 27 IND. L. REv. 1

(1993).

111. Ingber, supra note 40, at 772-73.
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it does not transfer P's loss to D. 112 Instead, P continues to experience
a loss, but D also experiences a loss, increasing the aggregate social
cost of the accident. Emotional distress is nonquantifiable in the sense
that no market exists to provide a standard by which to measure such
3
harm."l
Given the difficulties presented by these two characteristics of
emotional injuries, it is amazing that courts allow recovery for such
harms at all. Compensating such harms, however, meets other goals
of tort law: deterring wrongdoers and vindicating societal and personal
values.11 4 Courts have increasingly recognized the value of intangible
interests by protecting parties against infliction of emotional distress. "5 This is explained in part by social and cultural changes that
have occurred since the 1960s." 6 The increased attention to psychic
harms is:
[a] parallel to the growth of a "me-generation" striving for
self-awareness, personal well-being, health, and psychic security. This cultural focus on the need for "inner peace" and
the value of psychological therapy suggests that society perceives intangible injuries as real and that fairness demands

112. Transfer occurs in the damaged car example because when P's car is
damaged, its value is reduced by the amount it would cost to repair it. When D pays
P for the repairs, that loss of value is transferred to D.
113. Ingber, supra note 40, at 778.
114. Ingber, supra note 40, at 772. See also GuiDo CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS,
ATTITUDES AND THE LAW

83 (1985).

115. See Di Costa v. Aeronaves de Mexico, 973 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992)
(history of California's development of tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress since Amaya); Estrada v. Aeronaves de Mexico, 967 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir.
1992) (case involving the same aircraft accident as Di Costa, but Estrada heard the
plane hit her home and saw her home burn down, knowing her husband and children
were inside. The court allowed recovery for emotional distress.); Thing v. La Chusa,
771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); Shuamber v.
Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991); Neff v. Lasso, 555 A.2d 1304 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989), appeal denied 565 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1989) (plaintiff appeared at the accident
scene immediately after its occurrence and was allowed to recover damages for
emotional distress after witnessing the victim's injuries); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v.
Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987). See also Guthrie, supra note 17; Annotation,
Immediacy of Observation of Injury as Affecting Right to Recover Damages for
Shock or Mental Anguish from Witnessing Injury to Another, 5 A.L.R.4th 833
(1978); John S. Herbrand, Annotation, Relationship Between Victim and PlaintiffWitness as Affecting Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Shock or Mental
Anguish at Witnessing Victim's Injury or Death, 94 A.L.R.3d 486 (1974).
116. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
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that the tort system should provide some method of redress
to victims of such injuries. "7
These changes have affected the societal and personal values sought
to be vindicated by tort law.
One of the problems with compensating victims for emotional
distress, according to Ingber's approach, is that of nontransferability.118 If D pays money to P, but P continues to, feel distress, there
are now two losses, D's financial loss, and P's loss of emotional wellbeing. But are there? It is arguable that the payment of damages for
emotional distress does help to relieve the amount of distress experienced by an injured party. 1 9 There is a recognized phenomenon,
called "compensation neurosis," that has to do with the way injured
persons involved in litigation just cannot seem to get better (either
physically or mentally) until conclusion of the litigation or a settlement. 120
An individual seeking damages for intangible injuries ...
typically is encouraged to focus on his suffering, to preserve,
nurture, and memorialize every vexation and twinge of pain.
Yet such concentration on one's suffering may be contrary to
sound medical practice, which encourages the victim to quickly
put the accident or traumatic event behind him and strive to
2
return to a normal life.' '
To the extent, then, that a settlement ends the focus on suffering,
plaintiffs' losses are transferred upon compensation.
Another aspect of emotional injuries that may be transferred is
the victim's feelings of outrage when their distress remains unrecog117. Ingber, supra note 40, at 773 (first use of the term "me-generation" is
credited to journalist Tom Wolfe).
118. Ingber, supra note 40, at 781; see supra notes 111-113 and accompanying
text.
119. But cf. Ingber, supra note 40, -at 806 nn. 165-66 (suggesting that the victim's
concentration on his emotional suffering while seeking damages for intangible harms
may actually increase the suffering). Ingber questions, however, whether the real
injury is "uncompensated" pain and distress, which could be transferable. Id. at 780
n.38.
120. Krahulik, supra note 6. Justice Krahulik, who spent 20 years practicing tort
law prior to his appointment to the bench, stated that the parties are not faking,
they really do hurt, but they "hold on to their injury" until the case is settled. He
further stated that doctors have told him that their patient will not be able to recover
physically from their injuries until the lawsuit is settled. "They just can't let
themselves focus on anything but the lawsuit." Id. See generally Schetky & Guyer,
supra note 6, at 966; Sparr & Boehnlein, supra note 10, at 294.
121. Ingber, supra note 40, at 806-07.
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nized and uncompensated. "To the extent that pain and suffering and
emotional distress are real injuries, denial of compensation creates
the appearance of legal and societal indifference to the victim's
plight.' 1 22 That indifference may trigger further suffering or humiliation in the plaintiff, which compounds the emotional distress. "An
effective remedy system for intangible injuries, therefore, should
accentuate the positive and minimize -the negative ramifications of
123
litigation."
Regardless of whether the injury is transferable, compensation is
necessary if society wants to show its commitment to and support of
psychic well-being, thus demonstrating the social value of an individual's interest in freedom from distress. From the perspective of a
victim of emotional distress, "compensation is not just reimbursement, it is making amends for the injury done by bestowing a
'consolation' .. .
124 Conversely, by not granting damages, the court
bestows a sort of "legal entitlement" on the defendant to cause this
type of injury. If a plaintiff is outraged enough by the court's
indifference, he or she may decide to use violent self-help. Therefore,
the money serves as an "important symbolic means of preserving the
entitlement of personal security and autonomy against infringement."1 25
For these reasons, Ingber proposes that courts allow recovery of
emotional distress damages, restricted, however, to pecuniary damages. 26 In this way, temporary emotional discomforts will remain
with the victim, but longer-term disabling conditions will be compensated. This system would also encourage victims to get professional
help, because they would be fully compensated for all out-of-pocket
expenses. 27 Although he acknowledges that pecuniary losses are not
the only harms experienced by the victim, Ingber bases his entire
system on the following premises: 1) general damages do not provide
meaningful compensation to victims; 2) society sufficiently acknowledges the victim's right to emotional security by granting pecuniary
damages; 3) the remaining injury is truly nonquantifiable and nontransferable, and therefore is best borne by the victim; and 4) victims
have unique, individualized reactions to psychic pain. 21
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

781.
807.
781.
782.
782-83.
782.
783-84. Anticipating the argument that compensation for pecuniary
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Ingber notes that tort law examines two distinct issues when
deciding a claim: 1) whether the victim is entitled to recover; and 2)
whether the defendant ought to pay. 1 29 "In effect, tort law does not
compensate victims; it merely shifts the loss and thus changes the
victim's identity.''130 Since this shifting is costly, an interest beyond
mere compensation is needed to justify its cost. He identifies this
interest as "restitutive justice."' 131

Restitutive justice is a mechanism for determining who should
bear the burden of losses. "Underlying this view is a belief that
32
fairness demands that the blameworthy compensate the blameless."'
In the past, courts focused on moral blameworthiness when determining liability to preserve social order and public peace.' 33 General
damages for pain and suffering developed to "punish wrongdoers
and assuage the feelings of the wronged."'13 4 Although appropriate
with intentional or reckless torts, this justification for general damages
carries less weight with negligence liability because such liability occurs
even when a person is seeking to avoid harming another. Consequently, the demand for restitutive justice in negligence law comes
from a sense of rule or expectation violation.
Ingber argues that with widespread use of liability insurance,
intangible injuries are no longer paid for by the rule-breaker, but by
the public through risk spreading.' Consequently, the only restitutive
justice a victim receives is the recognition of the defendant as the
rule-breaker. Such recognition, however, is achieved by pecuniary
36
damages, and therefore, general damages are no longer necessary.
Liability insurance also interferes with tort laws' ability to deter
wrongful behavior by punishing wrongdoers. Because the insurance
company pays for the cost of the defendant's negligence, he or she
has less of an economic incentive to avoid such behavior in the
losses alone seems unfair, Ingber points out that people do not generally structure
their own compensation schemes to cover nonpecuniary losses. Nonpecuniary, emotional distress coverage is not offered in first party insurance plans, although a person
is just as likely to suffer emotional distress at the loss of a home to fire. Id.
129. Id. at 786.
130. Id.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 787.
133. Id. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (1964).
134. Ingber, supra note 40, at 788. In this way, the victim was assured that the

moral wrongdoer did not receive cost-free pleasure at the victim's expense.
135. Id.at 790.

136. Id. at 789. Ingber does, however, acknowledge the continued need for

general damage awards against willful wrongdoers. Id.
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future.1 7 Ingber points to this phenomenon as another reason why
general damages are no longer necessary.
Although he views general damages as unnecessary, Ingber recognizes the important social influence of allowing recovery for emotional distress damages. By allowing such damages "society is formally
recognizing such injuries. This recognition, in turn, may subtly enhance the perception of those affected by these injuries."' 38 By
ignoring emotional distress claims, society would discourage them and
they would arguably decrease. The law both responds to and molds
social attitudes. What the law accomplishes, therefore, depends on
what attitudes and characteristics are valued by society. Especially
with emotional distress claims arising after witnessing the serious
injury or death of one's child, people may be willing to pay the price
for a more empathetic and caring society.' 39 The remedy offered by
the legal system can determine the substantive rules and should
conform to societal goals. "A system that awards damages for
pecuniary losses associated with intangible injuries-but refuses general damages-would demonstrate societal concern for the victim's
plight while emphasizing rehabilitative needs rather than suffering.
Thus, the system's focus would be positive-on healing-rather than
negative-on disability." " 40
Ingber's proposals work the same whether the emotional distress
is suffered by a direct victim of the defendant's negligent conduct or
by a bystander who witnessed it. The traditional concerns that led to
the development of limitation devices 4' become less relevant because
they concentrate on the wrong issue: the scope of liability, rather than
the type and extent of damages. 42 Under his system, a "defendant's
behavior will lead to liability only if it was reasonably likely to cause
significant distress in the ordinary individual."' 143 Basically, this proposal advocates replacing "strained and arbitrary rules that limit
liability for emotional distress with a damage limitation model that
would more efficiently fulfill the objectives of tort law."'"4
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Ingber, supra.note 40, at 793.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 808.
Id.
Supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
Ingber, supra note 40, at 818.
Id.
Id. at 819. For Ingber's proposed system to work, it must address the issue

of attorney fees. One explanation for allowing general damages for intangible harms
has been that it provides a source of funds to offset the costs of litigation. If courts
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Ingber's approach assumes that people are covered by insurance,
which offsets the cost of litigation and insulates defendants from tort
law's deterrent effect. Liability insurance, however, is not universally
held, and is becoming more scarce as costs rise. 45 Likewise, insurance
coverage is not available for certain types of harms, such as the
Kumiegas' emotional distress, which occurred as a result of their
46
daughter's death following a surgical procedure.
Ingber's assertion that general damages are a clumsy way of
paying attorney fees does not counter this very real criticism of his
pecuniary-damages-only plan. Although Ingber includes in his proposal a call for court-awarded attorney fees,' 47 the response to this
call seems unlikely to be positive. Not only are courts reluctant to
award attorney fees in tort disputes because of the potential effect it
would have on settlements,' 48 but they are also constrained by public
perceptions. To routinely provide attorney fee awards in every successful tort claim would give the appearance of collusion between the
courts and attorneys aimed at perpetuating attorneys' sources of
income. The criticism of attorneys and the corresponding myth that
litigation occurs soley to pad attorneys' pockets, rather than to
promote justice, would be reinforced.
Currently, plaintiffs with physical injuries and derivative emotional harm collect general damages for pain and suffering. A portion
begin to compensate victims only for their pecuniary losses, then the victims will be
the losers. Ingber maintains that awarding general damages as a way to provide
attorney fees is a clumsy way of going about it. Id. It would be much better, he
says, if courts simply awarded attorney fees as part of damages. Id. at 810-11.
Another problem his system might encounter is a reluctance on the part of
insurance companies to settle claims, because going to trial would encompass less
risk when the victim cannot obtain general damages. Ingber suggests adding a fixed
surcharge to the court-awarded damages whenever the insurance company could have
settled for the same or less than what the victim got at trial. Id. at 813.
145. Although no statistics are available to prove how many people do not carry
insurance, the need for uninsured and underinsured motorist protection would seem
to support this notion. Arguably, it would also support the idea that those who are
sufficiently irresponsible as to avoid carrying liability insurance are also the ones who
are more likely to have accidents. This argument has some merit, but it smacks of a
moralistic judgment of the poor as "irresponsible" and accident prone.
146. Although liability insurance for such damages might exist in a state which
recognizes the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, it depends on whether
relief is extended to bystanders. First party insurance, such as the Kumiega's health
insurance policy, may afford some relief, but most health insurance plans limit
recovery for counseling to a percentage of the actual cost.
147. Ingber, supra note 40, at 810-11.
148. Ingber, supra note 40, at 811.
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of these damages are understood to be compensation for attorney
fees. If emotional distress is to be viewed as a legitimate type of
harm, then it, too, should result in general damages. Although
Ingber's call for a more straightforward method of dealing with
attorney fees and the corresponding guidance it would provide to
judges and juries is admirable and preferable to the current clumsy
system, it is likely to meet with a lukewarm reception.
Despite these minor criticisms, Ingber's proposal is beneficial
because it pushes courts off of square one-determining whether the
defendant owed a duty. Duty is just another word for determining if
social policy supports protection of the plaintiff's interests. Ingber
acknowledges that the interest in emotional well-being is worthy of
protection. His approach gives courts a means of recognizing and
protecting that interest, while also limiting liability and the administrative inefficiency that now plagues this area of law.
His hard and fast rule of restricting damages in pure negligence
cases just to pecuniary losses, however, seems to leave the victim
inadequately compensated. The Kumiegas, in the opening case, would
receive compensation for lost wages, psychotherapy, and medications
under Ingber's scheme. But they would still be left with attorney fees
and other costs of the litigation which would reduce their settlement
to less than their out-of-pocket expenses. Therefore, courts must
either define pecuniary losses to include the costs of bringing the suit,
or provide an outright award of attorney fees if this scheme is to
produce an equitable result by eliminating general damages. 49
In addition, Ingber's focus on remedies is too narrow. He sees
remedies only in terms of money damages. 150 Monetary compensation
makes sense when the loss is tangible, but when the loss is intangible,
at least part of the remedy should be of the same coin. Because
general damages would no longer be awarded if Ingber's proposal
were followed, the victim would still be missing an essential part of
the remedy. Although imprecise and customarily used to offset the
cost of litigation, general damages also give victims some extra
recognition of the permanence and intangibility of their loss. Money
149. lngber does not propose total elimination of general damages. They would
be retained in instances when they are needed to punish or deter particularly
blameworthy behavior or to encourage primary cost avoidance. Id. at 791 n.92.
150. Ingber differentiates between general intangible harms arising from accidents, and those reputational and privacy injuries resulting from the communicative
process. Id. This second category of harms is unique and implicates "conflicting
social interests" and freedom of speech. Id. In this context, Ingber proposes nonmonetary remedies. Id. at 835-37.
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cannot replace a loved one, or heal a wounded heart, but it can
provide some offsetting future pleasure or financial security that
recognizes the severity of the victim's loss.'
In lieu of general
damages, the legal system must be able to offer emotional distress
victims something else. Determining what that something else should
be, however, calls for a more creative approach to remedies.
III.

SEARCH FOR CREATIVITY

Stanley Ingber's proposal for eliminating arbitrary barriers to
liability for claims of emotional distress is echoed by some courts and
other commentators. 5 2 His suggestion of replacing the barriers with
limitations on damages is a step in the right direction. It acknowledges
both the inherent unfairness of an arbitrarily restrained system, and
also recognizes the usefulness of economic theory in explaining legal
processes. Feminist theory is valuable in alerting courts to the biases
that may be reflected in their past decisions, and prescribing a more
context-based, subjective view to be employed when deciding among
competing interests. Neither of these views alone, however, fully
addresses the problems involved with emotional distress claims. Combined, they approach the point of dealing with emotional harms in a
way that satisfies social values and creates positive social norms.
Ingber's approach uses an economic strategy to resolve the dilemma of whether to compensate victims of emotional harms. Determining if a rule is economically efficient, however, depends on what
economic philosophy predominates in the community."' What is
efficient is connected to our attitudes and beliefs and "always must
respond to the question of whom we wish to make richer or poorer." 154
Feminists would argue that the choice has been to make men richer
and women poorer.'
If attitudes and beliefs are shaped by the law, as Dean Guido
Calabresi argues, 5 6 then society must be careful to ensure that the
151. See Pearson, supra note 20, at 502. If the Kumiegas had received a general

damages award, for example, they might have taken Maryanne on a trip, during
which the three of them could relax, recuperate and renew their bonds with each
other.
152. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 1987). See

also Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery For Psychic Injury,
36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 335 (1984).
153. Robin Paul Malloy, Toward A New Discourse Of Law And Economics, 42
SYRACUsE L. REV. 27, 34 (1991).
154. CALABRESI, supra note

114, at 69.
155. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
156. CALABREsr, supra note 114, at 84.

1993:71]

BYSTANDER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS VICTIMS

law is free of bias. Although Calabresi acknowledges that psychic
harm is as real as physical harm, he suggests there are practical
reasons why such harms "based on our feelings for others" should
remain uncompensated.' 7 Those reasons include widely held beliefs
that the costs of pyschic harms should remain with the victim, because
otherwise, awarding damages for such harms will increase actual
suffering.' He notes that if people have a legally recognized right to
freedom from emotional distress, a portion of their distress is related
to a feeling of having a right violated, which induces them to pay
more attention to the distress. s9 This is an example of how the law
60
shapes attitudes and beliefs.
What is important about Calabresi's theory is that people's
attitudes do change, and they can become callous to certain activities
based on how the law treats the actors. "One of the extraordinary
things about the human species is that it is so adaptable. It is at once
a great strength . . . and a terrible moral danger.' ' 61 The danger is
that people will become callous to the wrong things. Society wants its
members to feel a close, loving relationship with their spouses and
children, otherwise it would risk disintegration of a powerful civilizing
force-the family. Consequently, the law should protect the relationships among those groups of claimants, or similarly situated groups.
As a society we must decide "whether we want to get accustomed,
whether we wish to become callous, or whether, instead, we think
society would be better off if we continued to view some things as
shocking, offensive or even abominable. 1 ' 62 If people view the negligent infliction of serious bodily harm or death as shocking, offensive
or abominable, they will expect their law to reflect that belief by
compensating closely-related witnesses to such events who experience
serious emotional distress as a result.
Calabresi states that our decisions are determined by short run
considerations when we do not care about the long run effect, or
when the long run analysis produces a stalemate. 63 Stalemate occurs
when competing interests are in equipoise. Society's interest in pro157. Id. at 71.
158. Id. at 77.
159. Id. at 78.
160. Id. Calabresi further supports this theory with examples of how social
attitudes toward desertion and divorce were affected by changes in the divorce laws,
making a divorce easier to obtain. Id.
161. Id. at 82.
162. Id. at 83.
163. CALABRESI, supra note. 114, at 85.
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tecting the parent-child relationship, for example, has been offset by
an equal interest in preserving the underlying bias against the rights
of women. 164 For that reason it is imperative that lawyers and judges
be aware of the existence of bias in the applicable case law, as well
as any possible bias in themselves. Removing gender bias from the
law is the justification for breaking the stalemate, thus tipping the
scales in favor of protecting relationships.
Although some progress has been made, the scales have not
tipped uniformly, or to the same degree in all states. Indiana, for
example, has allowed recovery for emotional distress suffered by a
mother and daughter who witnessed the negligently inflicted fatal
injury to their son and brother during an automobile accident. 65 The
Indiana Supreme Court recognized that the mother's distress no longer
had to be a result of her own physical injuries (Indiana's version of
the "impact rule"), but stated that because she was in the car, she
was a victim of impact by the defendant. 166 Consequently, it is not
clear whether this state would allow recovery for a mother in Margery
67
Dillon's position.
The feminists' and Ingber's approaches to bystander liability
move in the right direction, but in some respects only point the way.
Feminists argue for consideration of context and decision-making
based on a subjective rather than an objective standard, but they fail
to propose a means for limiting liability.168 Ingber notes that if courts
limit damages they will both satisfy the victims' need to feel vindicated
and society's need to limit liability, but he fails to account for the
costs of litigation.169 Calabresi mixes in a powerful justification for
change in emotional distress law. 170 What the law protects, society
164. Support for this theory lies in the fact that when more men started bringing
these types of claims, the scales tipped in favor of recovery. See supra text accompanying notes 51-64.
165. Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991).
166. Id. at 456.
167. See supra text accompanying note 18. Illinois courts would likely not allow
recovery because Margery was not in the zone of danger, a limitation device still
being employed in this state. See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1 (Il.
1983); see also Buckley v. Jones Truck Lines, 778 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(discussing effect of Rickey on Illinois's prior impact rule in context of truck collision
with natural gas facility causing explosion which destroyed home of plaintiffs).
168. See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
169. Although his proposal calls for courts to allow recovery of attorney fees if
they restrict general damages to intentional torts, the likelihood that courts would do
so is insubstantial. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
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values.' 71 Peoples' attitudes and beliefs are affected by the law.
Consequently, removing bias from the way the law deals with emotional distress can ignite similar changes in social values.
By denying a remedy for emotional distress to closely-related
bystanders, society gives up a rule that supports and reinforces the
value of caring for one another, in exchange for administrative
efficiency based on certainty in the law. Holmes once said: "I look
forward to a time when the part played by history in the explanation
of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we
shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained
and the reasons for desiring them."'17 2 Holmes' words are truer now
than ever. Our current jurisprudential system cannot deal with pure
emotional distress claims because the system is based on rational,
principled, objective thinking. It suffers from its own logic, because
the means of arriving at decisions have become the criteria for
determining whether or not a claim has merit. The ends that should
be sought, social justice and enforcement of social norms that reinforce the value of relationships, are ill-served by a policy of invalidating distress at their loss.
Imagine being in Gail Shuamber's shoes. A single mother, Gail
picked her two small children up from the sitter's after work, drove
to check on her parents' home for them while they were on vacation,
and headed east on a four-lane street into town to run a few errands
before going home to make dinner. Suddenly a car in the opposite
lane began to veer in her direction, she swerved to avoid him, but
couldn't, and his car struck hers just behind the driver's door. Her
little boy, Zachary, was sitting in the back seat directly behind her.
Afterwards, Gail and her daughter Katherine, bloody and shaken, got
out and called to Zachery but he did not respond. He was slumped
over in the car, bleeding from his head and his ear was purple. He
felt cold. Gail and Katherine waited ten long minutes for paramedics
and police to arrive, calling Zachary's name. He was rushed to the
hospital and Gail was informed of his death more than three hours
later, after she had repeatedly asked about him.'
At the trial, Mr. Henderson, the driver of the other car, repeatedly denied he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the
accident. His blood alcohol content, however, was certified at the
171. See Ingber, supra note 40, at 807.
172. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAIv. L. REV. 457, 474
(1897); see supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
173. Brief for Appellant at 5-8, Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind.
1991) (No. 9001-CV-1).
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scene as .19%.114 Henderson also denied he had swerved across the
center line, claiming that Gail had swerved into him. 75 Damages for
pecuniary losses alone would not help regain her sense of well-being.
A better remedy might include damages for her pecuniary losses, in
addition to an admission by Henderson that he was intoxicated and
caused the accident, and that he was sorry for causing the death of
her son. 7 6 It is precisely this tailoring of the remedy to the context
that feminist theory suggests.
Feminists argue that tort law should emphasize responsibility for
one's actions, instead of the recognition of rights, autonomy and
abstraction. Tort law should set a priority on safety rather than
profits or efficiency.' 7 ' Feminine voices, they argue, can "design a
tort system that encourages behavior that is caring about others'
safety and responsive to others' needs or hurts, and that attends to
human contexts and consequences." ' 7 Such a system would recognize
the need for a unique remedy for serious emotional harm as a result
of witnessing the severe injury or death of a loved one. Rather than
seek ways to limit a defendant's liability, thereby reducing a victim's
chances of obtaining a legal remedy, feminism would seek to offer a
remedy tailored to the situation.
To encourage Henderson to act in the future in a way that is
caring about others' safety, the court would have to require more
than pecuniary damages from him. Henderson's behavior, driving a
vehicle while intoxicated, would call for general damages even in
Ingber's model. If the court paid attention to context and the surrounding circumstances, however, it would recognize the need for an
additional remedy. Henderson refused to admit fault. He might
respond to some mechanism that would impress upon him the impact
of Gail's loss and his role in causing this loss. Currently, such a
mechanism is not available from a court of law.
Ingber mistakenly views pecuniary damages as a sufficient salve
on the victim's feelings of outrage." 79 Sometimes a sincere and heartfelt
apology that admits fault will help the victim heal quicker than other
174. Id. at 12.
175. Id.

176. Although a court-compelled apology, if possible, might lack sincerety, its
effect on the victim provides the remedy.
177. Bender, supra note 75, at 32.
178. Id.

179. This criticism is aimed only at Ingber's discussion of general intangible
harms, not the discussion of the unique intangible harms associated with defamation
and privacy torts. See supra note 150.
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remedies.180 Sometimes additional remedies are needed. Some victims
would benefit from the defendant making amends by offering his or
her services, attending counseling sessions, or performing public service in the decedent's honor.
Neither Ingber's nor the feminists' approach addresses the problem of the length of time a typical lawsuit and settlement take, and
l
the resultant increase in suffering to the victim.' In addition to
tailoring the remedy to the context, tort law should also tailor the
process. Throughout the entire process the victim must relive the
event, re-experience the pain, and in general, remain almost frozen in
time until the claim is resolved. For victims of emotional distress, the
amount of time consumed prolongs and heightens their distress until
resolution of the claim. For this reason, and the fact that victims may
not be able to get the tailored, ideal remedy that would best meet
their needs, emotional distress claimants would benefit from seeking
justice through another door.
The formality of the courtroom and the inflexibility of judicial
remedies make litigation a less than ideal way to resolve emotional
distress claims. Judges should be sensitive to the effect the process
has on the extent and severity of the claimant's distress. By recognizing
that certain claimants confront bias in the judicial system, and certain
types of claims, such as bystander emotional distress cases, are not
conducive to objective determination, judges will be more willing to
steer the disputants into another forum. That forum is mediation,
where the parties will have access to a court-appointed mediator to
82
help them take control of their case and resolve their own dispute.'
If the dispute remains in the court, judges should be careful to
consider what motivates their decisions. Judging involves choice and
the choices are based on conscious and subconscious motives and
considerations. "It is often through these subconscious forces that
judges are kept consistent with themselves and inconsistent with each"
other."' 83 What may be buried in the subconscious is unrecognized
180. Krahulik, supra note 6.
181. Id. See also Larry Ray & Anne L. Clare, The Multi-Door Courthouse Idea:
Building the Courthouse of the Future Today, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 7, 8
(1985).
182. This is not to suggest that mediation is a perfect solution to the problem.
A comprehensive analysis of alternative dispute resolution is beyond the scope of this
article. My intent is merely to suggest the use of alternative processes that would
provide more creative remedies than are available through the more traditional legal
system.
Much has been written criticizing the results and process of mediation, especially
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bias against the plaintiff on the basis of gender. Cardozo stated that
judges, just like the rest of us, have an "underlying philosophy of
life. All their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot
name, have been tugging at them-inherited instincts, traditional
beliefs, acquired convictions; and . . . when reasons are nicely balanced, [these] must determine where the choice shall fall."''8 By
recognizing the reality of that effect, judges will be able to make
choices that avoid perpetuating an underclass based on gender and
denying legal recognition and protection of their rights and interests.
Being able to gain that level of insight, however, requires the exercise
of imagination and creativity. Lawyers can assist in this process by
the way they frame their arguments and the policies and rationales
they emphasize.
CONCLUSION

This article began by asking what victims of emotional distress
want from the law. The answer is as diverse and complex as the
people who bring such cases. Courts are encouraged to pay attention
to that diversity and complexity and to recognize any biases within
the substantive rules or the courthouse walls. Sensitivity to the existence of bias will help judges discover a remedy that will benefit both
the plaintiff and society. When judges view a victim of emotional
distress in context, they will be much more likely to discern what the
victim needs from the law.
Victims seek relief from their emotional pain, but the relief they
are seeking is not always the type typically awarded by courts. Because
their harms are intangible, they need to know that society recognizes
the validity of their complaints. Ingber properly notes that such
validation is achieved by awarding pecuniary damages. 85 Victims also
want to end their suffering. A settlement or judgment represents
closure of the episode and thus enables them to begin to put the event

the way mediators are unable to remedy power differentials in ongoing relationships.

See generally James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the
End of "Good Mediation?", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991); Hill, supra note 108;
Craig A. McEwen, Pursuing Problem-Solving Or Predictive Settlement, 19 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 77 (1991) (responding to Menkel-Meadow's criticism and suggesting
differentiation among ADR processes); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement
in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR",
19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991) (criticizing co-optation in the mediation process).
183. CARDOZO, supra note 100, at 11-12.
184. Id.

185. Ingber, supra note 40, at 782.
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behind them. The quicker they get to closure, the less they will suffer.
Victims also want the rule-breaker labelled as such, as well as to
hear an admission of fault. Some, however, would benefit from more
than pecuniary compensation, validation and restitutive justice. For
them, the healing process would be enhanced by the opportunity to
vent their feelings of anger, anguish, guilt and sorrow at the defendant. This remedy, which is of the same coin as the harm, is not
available in a traditional court of law. To receive such a remedy, the
claimant must go through another door.
The door through which they might find a better solution is that
of court-annexed alternative dispute resolution (ADR), specifically
"mediation." Mediation would offer the claimant the opportunity to
vent feelings of indignation, obtain agreement from the defendant for
payment of out-of-pocket expenses, and perhaps to hear an apology.
The mediation agreement reached by the parties could include such
things as the defendant sitting with the claimant and a therapist while
the claimant "tells her story.' ' 6 In some states, the mediation agreement is formalized into a stipulation and filed with the court, which
then issues an order on the basis of the agreement.8 7 This arrangement
puts the full enforcement mechanism of the court behind the partycreated solution to the problem. The advantages are obvious.
In addition to providing flexible remedies and a forum conducive
to professionally-guided interpersonal communication between the
parties, mediation also offers the advantage of reducing the length of
time needed to arrive at a resolution. Given that victims are often
unable to begin the healing process until the dispute is resolved,
coupled with the fact their emotional distress is magnified by repeated
retelling of the story, a system that offers quicker results will actually
reduce the distress.
Another advantage of mediation is that it allows the parties to
negotiate face to face. Such negotiating would be ineffective, however,
without the backdrop of legal recognition of recognized emotional
distress as a compensable harm. Only then will the victim experience
both a greater feeling of control over the dispute and have the
necessary leverage to obtain a meaningful remedy.
Court-annexed ADR has been criticized recently, because it is
becoming as rigid and formal as the courtroom from which the
186. This remedy allows the claimant to express her anger and grief at its natural
target, which then facilitates healing.
187. IND. A.D.R. R. 2.7(E)(2),(3), INDIANA PRACTICE, RULES ON ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1992). Forty-seven states passed or modified laws on alternative
dispute resolution during the 1980s. Bruce Brodigan et al., State Legislation on
Dispute Resolution, in MONOGRAPH SERIES ABA, COMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
IIIB (1988).
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disputants fled. 8 8 There are problems inherent in any system that
purports to assist parties in resolving individual disputes. This article
cannot fully address such problems. What is important is that there
are alternatives for emotional distress victims, some of which have
not been fully explored. These alternatives provide the opportunity to
allow courts to adopt Ingber's proposal for shifting the focus away
from arbitrary barriers and towards focusing on the remedy. They
also provide a place where the concrete experiences of the parties may
join to tailor a remedy that reflects the context and circumstances of
the specific case.
Alternative dispute resolution is preferable in cases where "the
nature of the dispute requires a broader range of remedies and a
broader focus on the issues" than courts can provide. 8 9 Bystander
emotional distress claims are such cases. Courts should step aside and
direct claimants through the mediation door, allowing the parties to
craft their own tailored remedy, secure in the knowledge that negligent
infliction of emotional distress to a closely-related bystander is a
legally recognized wrong.

188. See generally supra note 181.
189. Hill, supra note 108, at 340.

